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POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE CIVIL WAR:
A TRIAL RUN
DANIEL W. HAMILTON*

The People Themselves is simultaneously a work of constitutional history and constitutional theory, and the book provokes different responses
from each discipline.1 Constitutional law scholars have critiqued or defended Kramer's claim that the Supreme Court should not be the final or
definitive authority on the meaning of the Constitution. Legal and constitutional historians have critiqued or defended Kramer's claim that the Supreme Court was not the final or definitive authority on the Constitution for
much of American legal history.
Kramer is, of course, interested in proving both claims. The history in
the book is put to work in the present. In response to modem concerns that
increased popular control over the Constitution or increased division of
constitutional interpretation between the branches will result in chaos,
Kramer deploys his history as evidence that this fear is unfounded. Our
own era of judicial supremacy, in which the interpretive supremacy of the
Supreme Court is more or less unquestioned, is largely a historical anomaly. Kramer seeks to demonstrate that we modems are out of step with a
long and largely neglected tradition of popular control over the Constitution that thrived in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and lost ground
beginning only in the decades that followed the New Deal era. 2
Those of us primarily interested in the book as a work of history can
treat Kramer's arguments as free-standing historical claims and can jump
ship before the argument arrives in the present. That the book combines
historical analysis with contemporary constitutional debate is itself a challenge to historians trained to avoid the sin of "presentism" above all else. 3
* Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I would like to thank Jonathan
Lahn for his wonderful work as a research assistant and student editor at the Chicago-Kent Law Review. I would also like to thank Michael Les Benedict, Morton Horwitz, Richard Ross, and Daniel
Hulsebosch for helpful ideas and discussions.
1. See LARRY D. KRAMER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).

THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:

POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM

AND

2. Id.at220-21.
3. See e.g., Lynn Hunt, Against Presentism, PERSP., May 2002, at 7; see also PETER NOVICK,
THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY QUESTION" AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION

(1988).
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Yet whatever his interest in shaping current constitutional interpretation,
Kramer's book is important as a work of history for two main reasons.
First, Kramer has been careful to ground his arguments in close readings of
primary sources, and has avoided the "law office history" that legal historians, and Kramer himself, are quick to condemn. 4 Second, Kramer's ambitious historical analysis-he ranges across more than two centuries of
constitutional history-introduces a new set of interpretive questions that
allow for a fresh understanding of constitutional practice across historical
eras. Even as historians do the valuable work of testing the book's particular claims, the main historical impact of The People Themselves lies, I
think, in its capacity to reframe the long-established set pieces of constitutional history.
It is important to remember that Kramer's book is not a history of the
framing of the Constitution and its interpretation in the early Republic. This
is a central focus, but its ambition is much greater. Kramer asserts not only
that popular constitutionalism survived the Constitutional Convention and
Marbury v. Madison, but that it remained a potent legal and constitutional
force until roughly the end of the New Deal in the 1940s. 5 One claim supports the other. If Kramer persuades us that popular constitutionalism lived
for much longer than previously thought, if it did not wither in the antebellum era, then we can begin to see it in high relief in later eras and track its
course after the Early National period and into the mid-nineteenth and
twentieth centuries.
The ambition of the book-to tell the whole story of the rise and fall
of American popular constitutionalism from the colonial era to Bush v.
Gore-acts as a bracing rejection of the scholarly turn to increasingly specialized sub-fields of historical and constitutional inquiry. If the potential
dangers of such a broad approach are manifest, so are the benefits. In particular, looking at constitutional history through the lens, or analytical
frame, of popular constitutionalism provides a way to consider how conceptions of constitutional authority shifted across and inside different eras
in legal history. Kramer's central insight-that the demand for popular
control over the Constitution remained a powerful political and legal force
for much longer than is commonly thought today-suggests that his work
might in fact be a corrective to presentism. Our own era's constitutional
history may well reflect our own era's devotion to judicial supremacy.
Kramer's book acts as a caution to historians not to import the currently
4. See generally Larry D. Kramer, When Lawyers Do History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 387
(2003).
5. See KRAMER, supra note 1, at 207-26.
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prevailing constitutional ideology into the past, and so neglect alternative
ideologies that contested for dominance.
In this way, The People Themselves produces important interpretive
questions as much as it produces original and important historical claims.
To my mind, two overarching questions are framed by popular constitutionalism, one institutional and one ideological. First, as an institutional
matter, how did popular constitutionalism work in practice, particularly
once "the people out of doors" went indoors? If all three branches shared
interpretive power over the Constitution, how was this accomplished on the
ground in different historical eras? Second, from an ideological perspective, how did the underlying justification for popular control over the Constitution change over time? This question takes as its premise that popular
constitutionalism is not a monolithic ideology moving through United
States history. 6 It is instead best understood as a set of broad interpretive
questions that focus on shifting ideological arguments over popular control
over the Constitution and their different institutional manifestations.
This approach to popular constitutionalism as a set of institutional and
ideological questions offers a new way to consider the constitutional history of the Civil War. The periodization of U.S. legal history often divides
into a pre-Civil War constitutional regime and a post-Civil War constitutional regime. In between is the constitutional history of the Civil War itself, which, while enormously studied, is still often treated as a largely selfcontained phenomenon. The Civil War is considered in near isolation, a
transformative event within which the Constitution was fundamentally
altered, and after which modem constitutional law begins. One of the virtues of The People Themselves is that it provides a method for considering
the constitutional questions of the Civil War in ways that link the great
constitutional issues of the war to the rest of the century. 7
It is fair to say that Kramer does not spend much time on the Civil
War. 8 In part this is not surprising. The Civil War was widely recognized,
at the time and since, as a moment of popular constitutionalism, at least in
6. Here I am indebted to discussions with Saul Cornell and his description of the different "modalities" of popular constitutionalism, and to Richard Ross who framed the question this way: is popular
constitutionalism one thing or multiple things with a strong family resemblance?
7. Other important books by Amy Dru Stanley and Michael Vorenberg have explored how legal
and constitutional change during the Civil War itself helped was connected to what came before and to
what came after, both exploring how the debates over emancipation helped transform notions of freedom during and after the Civil War. See generally AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO
CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION
(1998); MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, AND

THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT (2001).

8. Indeed, the American Civil War is explicitly referenced only three times in the text, on pages
32, 93, and 214. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 339 (index).
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so far as the Supreme Court was made suddenly less powerful as an interpreter of the Constitution on the eve of the war. The Court was largely
marginalized on constitutional questions during the war, in large part as a
result of the Dred Scott Case,9 which Charles Evans Hughes described as
one of the great "self-inflicted wounds" in the history of the Supreme
Court. 10 Kramer treats Dred Scott almost as a vignette, an illustration of a
moment when the Supreme Court badly overreached. Chief Justice Taney's
disastrous opinion is examined as the impetus for President Lincoln and the
Congress essentially ignoring the Supreme Court and leading to a reassertion of popular constitutionalism. I
For Kramer, the Civil War is a powerful example of a persistent popular constitutionalism, and once this claim is established, he moves quickly
on. Yet he leaves a great unanswered question in his wake, namely, how
did popular constitutionalism actually. work during the Civil War, both
institutionally and ideologically? If today, in a time of war, we look readily
to the courts to ultimately delineate who is and who is not an "enemy combatant," to determine what process detainees are due, and to decide what is
torture and what is not, the Civil War is an instance when wartime constitutional decisions were made in the relative absence of a powerful Supreme
Court and even in defiance of it. The Civil War thus has an arguably unique
role inside the history of popular constitutionalism. It is a valuable test
case, a sort of trial run for a popular constitutional regime that operated in a
time of terrible crisis alongside a marginalized Supreme Court, just as a
spate of new and urgent constitutional questions demanded immediate resolution.
We are, of course, familiar with many of the great constitutional questions of the Civil War. Was secession constitutional? Was a federal draft,
an income tax, or the imposition of a naval blockade constitutional? What
about the emancipation of four million slaves? Was emancipation a power
that belonged to the president or to the Congress, and did it require a constitutional amendment? Who could suspend the writ of habeas corpus and
for how long? All of these constitutional questions were effectively addressed during the Civil War, though only one by the Supreme Court, when
it sustained the constitutionality of the Union's naval blockade in The Prize
Cases in 1863.12
9. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
10. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS FOUNDATIONS,
METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 50 (1928).
11. See KRAMER, supra note 1, at 211-13.

12. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 691-92 (1863). Harold Hyman and William Wiecek
have argued that the decision in the Prize Cases "added to the Court's slim store of popular good will."

HeinOnline -- 81 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 956 2006

2006]

POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE CIVIL WAR: A TRIAL RUN

The Civil War was a period when Chief Justice Roger Taney was
widely reviled, and the Court largely discredited, if temporarily, in the
North. 13 It is an interesting question just how badly the legitimacy of the
Court was damaged by the Dred Scott decision after the war, but there can
be little doubt it was mostly ineffective on constitutional questions during
the war. 14 The Court was at its historical low point, and both the executive
and Congress ignored manifest holdings and plain orders from the Court
and its Justices. 15
Kramer naturally turns to the decision because it stands at the center
of one of the great constitutional contests between the Supreme Court and
the executive. A great deal of work is devoted to exploring the extent to
which President Lincoln openly defied the Supreme Court's decision in
Dred Scott. In the leading analysis of Don Fehrenbacher, Lincoln's stance
on Dred Scott was a "sophisticated realism that amounted to neither a full
acceptance nor a complete rejection of the doctrine of judicial supremacy."' 16 For Lincoln, the Dred Scott case decided only the fate of Dred
Scott, and the Court's declaration that the expansion of slavery into the
territories was constitutionally protected was one important, but not final,
voice. In his first inaugural address, Lincoln struck this balance, and his
assertion of the necessity of popular control of the Constitution remains
some of the most eloquent language of popular constitutionalism:

HAROLD M. HYMAN &

WILLIAM M. WIECEK,

EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW:

CONSTITUTIONAL

DEVELOPMENT 1835-1875, at 365 (1982).
13. See 3 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1928). Warren

writes that the Dred Scott opinion was met with "ridicule and abuse" from newspapers in the North,
which "could not fail to weaken the Court's status with the people." Id. at 41. As for Taney personally,
Warren's description of the reactions of the Northern press and radical Republicans in Washington to
Taney's death gives a sense of the "extreme rancor" with which he was regarded. See id. at 110-18.
14. PHILLIP S. PALUDAN, A COVENANT WITH DEATH: THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND EQUALITY
IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 190-91, 205-06 (1975). As Carl B. Swisher noted, "in this time of civil war...
little deference was accorded to judicial sportsmen. To a considerable degree the executive won dominance in matters which in other times would have been left to the courts." 5 CARL B. SWISHER,
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD 1836-64, at 974
(1974).
15. One response to the Dred Scott decision among Republican politicians and press was to accuse
the Supreme Court of being the mouthpiece of a "slaveholders' conspiracy" and adapting the Constitution for political ends. See DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS: 1848-1861, at 286-89 (Don E.
Fehrenbacher ed., 1976). The perception of the Court as illegitimate and politicized may have emboldened the other branches to make their own political-legal determinations in contradiction to those made
by the Court. Thus, Lincoln's executive branch maintained the constitutionality of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in spite of Justice Taney's decision that it was unconstitutional. In
a similar vein, Congress abolished slavery in the territories in June of 1862 even though the Court had
expressly denied Congress's power to do so in the Dred Scott opinion.
16. DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS 442 (I978).
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I do not forget the position assumed by some, that Constitutional questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court; nor do I deny that such
decisions must be binding in any case, upon the parties to a suit, as to the
object of that suit .... At the same time the candid citizen must confess
that if the policy of the government, upon vital questions, affecting the
whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme
Court, the instant they are made.... the people will have ceased, to be
their own rulers, having, to that extent, practically
resigned their gov17
eminent, into the hands of that eminent tribunal.
Lincoln went on effectively to limit even his prior concessions to judicial power over litigants, most notably in the context of Ex Parte Merryman, when Justice Taney, sitting as a circuit court judge, ordered the
release of a political prisoner arrested by the military following Lincoln's
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in Maryland. 18 Taney's writ was
blatantly ignored by the executive, prompting fury on the part of the aged
Taney, who thundered,
These great and fundamental laws, which congress itself could not suspend, have been disregarded and suspended.., by a military order, supported by force of arms. ... I can only say that if the authority which the
constitution has confided to the judiciary department and judicial officers, may thus ...be usurped by the military power, at its discretion, the
people of the United States are no longer living under a government of
laws ....

19

With Scott and Merryman in mind, as Fehrenbacher and others have
noted, Taney's position as Chief Justice gave the Lincoln administration
considerable constitutional leeway: "a Supreme Court headed by Taney
was a court without enough influence to restrain executive or congressional
20
power."
This was not due solely to sustained public hostility to the Dred Scott
decision. The Court was in some amount of disarray, as Justice John A.
Campbell of Alabama left Washington to join the Confederate government. 2 1 Taney made little secret of the fact that he considered secession a
valid, constitutional exercise of state power, and that much of the Lincoln
administration's war policy was unconstitutional. 22 Indeed, there is evi-

17. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, (Mar. 4, 1861), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES
AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, at 215, 220-21 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989).
18. Exparte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
19. Id. at 152.
20. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 16, at 575.
21.

DAVID M. SILVER, LINCOLN'S SUPREME COURT 9-13 (1956).

22. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 16, at 574-75. Fehrenbacher asserts that, if possible, Taney
"would have struck down many of the administration's principal war measures, including conscription,
emancipation, and the currency program." Id.
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dence that Taney was eager to strike down the Union draft, and had even
23
prepared a decision to that effect, waiting only for litigants.
With the Supreme Court essentially out of the constitutional picture,
the bulk of the fundamental, and often new, constitutional questions considered and addressed during the war were determined largely by the executive and executive branch. The question is, how? The short answer has
traditionally been, by Lincoln.
Lincoln's arguments-in his two inaugurals, in messages to Congress,
and in his letters and speeches-have drawn extraordinary scholarly scrutiny, and taken as a whole amount to a quasi-canon, a huge literature of
Lincoln's constitutional thought, explicated in classic work by J.G. Randall
and Harold Hyman, and more recently in important and influential books
24
by Garry Wills, Daniel Farber, and George Fletcher.
In this literature, Lincoln is generally treated as a kind of constitutional oracle, a one-man final arbiter of the great constitutional questions of
his day. Constitutional historians ask anew every generation, was Lincoln
right or wrong on particular questions of constitutional law, implicitly asserting that constitutional questions rested essentially with him before his
assassination and the emergence of a newly assertive Supreme Court in the
Reconstruction era.
This literature is extremely valuable in its analysis of Lincoln as an
extraordinarily important constitutional interpreter, and it highlights both
his ability to translate his wartime actions and goals into crystalline constitutional principles, and his undeniable impact on constitutional law and
interpretation. Yet I think the Lincoln-oriented line of inquiry is bearing
less and less fruit. I fear we modem historians, in turning to Lincoln as a
sort of constitutional oracle, reveal our reflexive reliance on a central, final
source of constitutional authority, with Lincoln effectively fulfilling the
function we today look for from the Supreme Court.
23. See Mark E. Neely, Jr., Justice Embattled The Lincoln Administration and the Constitutional
Controversy over Conscription in 1863, in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CIVIL WAR 47, 52 (Jennifer
M. Lowe ed., 1996) ("The Chief Justice, Roger B. Taney, had already written an opinion declaring the
draft unconstitutional and had it waiting in his desk for the first case that came before him raising the

issue!").
24.

See e.g., HERMAN BELZ, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND EQUAL RIGHTS IN

THE CIVIL WAR ERA (1998); DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION (2003); GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION: How LINCOLN REDEFINED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2001);
HAROLD M. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSTITUTION

(1975);

MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY:

ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1991); MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE LAST BEST HOPE OF
EARTH: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE PROMISE OF AMERICA (1993); J.G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (rev. ed. 1951); GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS

THAT REMADE AMERICA (1992).
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The lens of popular constitutionalism may well allow us to tell a more
textured and complete account of constitutional interpretation in the Civil
War. We can finally begin to jettison the important but ultimately unanswerable question, was Lincoln right or was Lincoln wrong in some definitive way on particular questions of constitutional law? Instead we can ask,
how did a popular constitutional regime function during the Civil War?
With the Supreme Court largely on the sidelines, operating neither as a
check nor as an interlocutor on constitutional questions, to what extent
were constitutional questions considered by the other branches? As an institutional matter, how did the executive branch and the Congress articulate
their interpretations of the Constitution and communicate them publicly? 25
These are questions about the Civil War to which we do not know the
answers, and we can only consider these questions once we look at the
Civil War through the lens of popular constitutionalism. In particular, I
think, popular constitutionalism provides a fresh way to assess the importance of the cadre of constitutional thinkers brought in to work for the Lincoln administration. During the Civil War, Lincoln hired an impressive
roster of lawyers and law professors who were given the task of interpreting the Constitution both for the president and for the public. Just as Lincoln was making his landmark constitutional arguments at Gettysburg and
elsewhere, legal thinkers were hired across the burgeoning federal bureaucracy, including the office of the Attorney General and, most notably, in the
War Department.
Their task was to address for themselves and for public consumption
the great constitutional issues of the Civil War. 26 Lengthy constitutional
tracts poured out of the Lincoln administration, and the tracts' arguments
both wrestled with the nuts and bolts of military legal policy and considered, among others, the constitutional questions of the legitimacy of secession, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, conscription, the
confiscation of property, and emancipation. This cadre worked simultaneously to justify the actions of the executive branch, and at the same time to
keep those actions within constitutional norms.
The most prominent of this cohort were William Whiting, the Solicitor
of the War Department, and Francis Lieber, a professor brought into the

25. For the role of the Congress in interpreting the Constitution on the eve of the Civil War, see
WHIGS, 1829-1861 (2005).
26. The Civil War thrust questions of constitutional interpretation into public discourse, and
"focused enormous attention" on constitutional issues. PHILLIP SHAW PALUDAN, "A PEOPLE'S
CONTEST": THE UNION AND CIVIL WAR, 1861-1865, at 27 (1988).
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DEMOCRATS AND
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War Department. 27 The group also included, among others, the former
Secretary of War Joseph Holt and two lawyers who ultimately became
generals, Ethan Allen Hitchcock and Henry W. Halleck. 2 8 Whiting was a
prominent Boston attorney, constitutional scholar, and former member of
Congress who began writing in support of the Lincoln Administration's
power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus when war broke out. Lincoln
personally asked that Whiting become Solicitor General of the War Department. In that role he published The War Powers of the President and
the Legislative Powers of Congress in Relation to Rebellion, Treason and
Slavery in 1862, which became the constitutional handbook of the Lincoln
Administration for discussion of the war power and martial law. This tract
went through ten editions over the next two years and was ultimately
enlarged in 1864 under a new title, War Powers Under the Constitution of
the United States. Between 1862 and 1871, the book went through a total of
29
forty-three editions and expanded from 144 to 355 pages.
Whiting was called on to provide a frame for considering the interaction of constitutional norms and military action at the outbreak of the Civil
War, a conflict that was in part quite analogous to an international war
between belligerents and in part quite distinct. His legal and constitutional
analysis did advance an expansive war power located in the president and
the military under his command, but it also elaborated the boundaries of
executive authority within a constitutional order:
It is not denied that the powers given to the various departments of govemnment are in general limited and defined ... [b]ut the powers claimed
for the President, and for Congress, in this essay, are believed to be delegated to them respectively
under the constitution, expressly or by neces30
sary implication.
Francis Lieber was a law professor from South Carolina by way of
Prussia, who came to Columbia University on the outbreak of war, leaving
behind a son who fought for the Confederacy and bringing one with him
who fought for the Union. He was hired by the War Department to write a
code delineating the powers of the army under martial law and to codify the
laws of war that would operate on the Union army in the field. Lincoln
27. See generally FRANCIS LIEBER, AMENDMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION: SUBMITTED TO THE
CONSIDERATION OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (New York, Loyola 1865); WILLIAM WHITING, MILITARY
ARRESTS IN TIME OF WAR (Washington, Gov't Printing Office 1863).
28. See HAROLD M. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR AND

RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSTITUTION (1975) (crediting Joseph Holt with the widespread circulation within the Army of opinions delineating the boundaries of military law and courts martial).
29. For an early edition, see WILLIAM WHITING, THE WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT, AND THE
LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS, IN RELATION TO REBELLION, TREASON AND SLAVERY (2d ed.,

Boston, John L. Shorey 1862).
30. Id. at iii.
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ordered this code, which became known as the Lieber Code, distributed to
his officers. The Lieber Code was a careful attempt-one of the first-to
define martial law and to regulate through a legal code the conduct of ar31
mies in the field.
Historians have long known about these legal thinkers in the Lincoln
administration. Harold Hyman's classic work on the constitutional history
of the Civil War pays some sustained attention to this group of constitutional bureaucrats, and asserts that "[flrom 1861-65, no university law
'3 2
faculty or private firm in the nation equaled this association of lawyers.
Phillip Paludan has closely and effectively considered the constitutional
thinking of Lieber, Parker, and other prominent legal intellectuals inside
and outside the Administration. 33 Hyman considers the impact of these
thinkers on military policy, and Paludan considers how their constitutional
arguments can be mined to discern broad schools of thought in the Civil
War era. No one has yet asked what role this group played in creating a
functioning popular constitutional regime during the Civil War, a question
that The People Themselves prompts us to ask.
The frame of popular constitutionalism provides a new way to assess
the importance of these constitutional bureaucrats. If the focus is on Lincoln alone, we ask only, what difference did they make to Lincoln? If the
focus is instead on how the executive branch made constitutional interpretations and arguments in an effort to sway public opinion, then the work of
these lawyers takes on a different significance. In particular, the work of
this group within the executive branch shows a forum for constitutional
decision making that existed during the Civil War that existed apart from
litigation in the federal courts. This cohort functioned as a sort of de facto
constitutional commission, essentially ruling on abstract questions of constitutional law and interpretation. They show how the executive branch
generated its own constitutional discourse in the midst of war, discourse
designed to meet a huge public appetite for constitutional analysis of the
rationale for executive action, in particular on the part of legal elites. These
tracts sold widely, suggesting that Lincoln hired these scholars and made
them visible because in some sense he had to hire them, that he could not
use the relative absence of the Supreme Court to act without attention to
constitutional norms.
31. See FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED
STATES, IN THE FIELD (New York, Van Nostrand 1863). For the classic piece on the importance of the
Lieber Code, see Frank Freidel, GeneralOrders 100 and Military Government, 32 MISS. VALLEY HIST.
REv. 541 (1946).
32. HYMAN, supra note 24, at 190.
33. See generally PALUDAN, supra note 14.
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It may seem strange to argue that the Lincoln administration was seriously concerned with the elaboration of constitutional norms in the midst of
a bloody, seemingly endless war. Yet, the constitutional innovations of the
Civil War era-of which there were many-were not unfettered improvisations on the part of the executive branch. Instead, they were part of a selfimposed drive on the part of the Lincoln administration to keep the exercise
of constitutional power within what they and the American public perceived as legitimate boundaries, and they reflected an increasing commitment in the antebellum era to an ideology of the rule of law.
The tracts produced by these lawyers were, of course, not neutral or
impartial, but neither were they constitutional fig leafs for a new imperial
presidency. The works of Whiting and others are ineffective as propaganda.
Their arguments are complicated, legalistic, and do not appeal to emotion.
Nor do they resemble judicial opinions. There are no litigants and no "cases
or controversies." What these tracts resemble more than anything else are
legal treatises in the manner of Joseph Story and James Kent. This quality
is perhaps natural, as these lawyers were part of a generation of lawyers
34
trained by the study of legal treatises.
In this attention to the precise powers and limits to constitutional authority, Civil War popular constitutionalism has, I think, a different ideological basis than its Revolutionary predecessor, or at least a different
legitimizing principle. If the basis for revolutionary popular constitutionalism was popular sovereignty, or the Constitution operating as the embodiment of popular will, by the time of the Civil War we see a popular
constitutionalism based more and more on an ideology of the rule of law.
Certainly, popular sovereignty was not entirely eclipsed. Multiple ideological arguments, and even multiple understandings of the rule of law, remained potent. Nonetheless, a popular and legal devotion to the ideal of a
rule of law that mediated the will of legal actors, including the majority,
was increasingly coming to the fore within constitutional culture.
It is a fair question whether popular sovereignty ideology is an intrinsic element of popular constitutionalism. In an important early review of
The People Themselves, Dan Hulsebosh argued that it was not; popular
sovereignty ideology and popular constitutionalism were distinct and could
align or separate in different historical eras.3 5 To some extent Kramer tells
34. For the influence of treatises, particularly those of Kent and Story, on the legal culture of the
nineteenth century, see generally DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664-1830, at 274-302

(2005).
35. Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Bringing the People Back In, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 653, 672-84 (2005)
(book review).
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this story. Kramer pays attention to changes in the professional training and
identity of lawyers, reflected in the treatises of Joseph Story and James
Kent. The emergence of the treatises as authoritative interpretations of
constitutional law not only redefined what lawyers were taught, but also
advanced a conception of constitutional law and courts: not as vehicles for
popular sovereignty and servants of the people's will, but as the protectors
of the constitution from excessive popular control and the legislative will of
the majority.
This rule of law ideology required those interpreting the Constitution
to place their arguments and their actions within the boundaries of legitimate constitutional norms that emphasized the subordination of political
will, quite a different norm than that of the Revolution. And popular constitutionalism in the Civil War cannot be properly understood without a recognition of the demand for constitutional legitimacy the people imposed on
the executive and the executive branch imposed on itself.
Turning to the present, Civil War popular constitutionalism provides a
valuable case study for how contemporary popular constitutionalism might
function. In The People Themselves, Kramer devotes much attention to the
institutional poplar constitutional techniques available to the legislature,
such as cutting off funding and impeaching judges. 36 At the same time, in
his discussions of presidents Jackson, Lincoln, and Roosevelt, Kramer locates many of the most powerful expressions of popular constitutionalism
inside the executive branch. Yet I believe that there would be a great deal
to be gained from considering in greater depth the institutional apparatus
that exists inside the executive branch-and not just the President-for
reasoned deliberation of constitutional questions. This includes, in their
modem incarnations, the Office of Legal Counsel, the office of the Attorney General, and the White House Counsel.
Today, the executive branch pursues wartime constitutional policy
while making every effort to remain as shielded as possible from public
view, surfacing only periodically when haled into court or in order to testify before Congress, and producing only such testimony and such documents as it must. This retreat inside itself on the part of the executive
branch may be a byproduct of modem judicial supremacy, as the executive
branch takes advantage of a near-exclusive reliance on the courts to publicly resolve constitutional questions. This reliance may well have driven
the rest of the constitutional decision making process inside the executive
branch essentially underground.

36. See KRAMER, supra note 1, at 249.
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This was not the case during the Civil War, when constitutional thinkers in the executive branch, and particularly the War Department, were
regularly making detailed constitutional claims designed to persuade the
public of the legitimacy of the executive's wartime constitutional interpretation. In America's greatest constitutional crisis, the Executive branch
simultaneously seized unprecedented constitutional authority while at the
same time making sustained constitutional arguments designed to legitimate that authority.
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